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COMMENTS ON THE LOGISTICAL SITUATION

The theoretical capacity of the roads and trails into South Vietnam is estimated at nearly 700 tons a day without interdiction. Recent interdiction efforts have reduced this capacity to about 400 tons per day.

12 tons a day is the estimated requirement for outside logistic support for 110 battalions at present levels of fighting (each battalion is engaged in combat about once in every 35 days and expends one-third of its basic load of ammunition during each day of combat).

70 tons a day from outside sources would be required for 110 battalions if the level of combat increased to the point where each of the 110 battalions engaged in combat once in every 7 days.

165 tons a day from outside sources would be required for 155 battalions if the level of combat increased to the point where each of the 155 battalions engaged in combat once in every 3 days.

The DRV has the estimated capability to train and infiltrate approximately 9 battalion equivalents, or 4,500 men per month. Since 1 November 1965, however, only 1 additional VC battalion and 2 additional PAVN battalions have been added to the order of battle estimate for VC-PAVN forces in South Vietnam.

Thus, a buildup to 155 battalions does not appear possible during 1966, unless VC-PAVN losses are reduced below projected levels.

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Note concerning Cambodia:

The possibility of supporting large-scale operations from Cambodia is very slight, although guerrilla operations could be supported in this way. It is doubtful that the Communists could move from Cambodia, through clandestine means alone, on a sustained basis, the 12 tons of military supplies needed daily by 110 VC-PAVN battalions in South Vietnam.

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